Reading done on May 9, 2018
"A Genealogy of Radical Islam"
- by Quintan Wiktorowicz - 2005
- Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:75–97, 2005 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Inc.
- ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100590905057 - accessed on May 9, 2018
"The Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed outline numerous rules about politics, economics, society, and individual behavior, but they do not directly respond to many questions relevant to the modern period. As a result, Salafis (and other Muslims) ask themselves what the Prophet would do if he were alive today. Given the way he lived his life and the principles he followed, how would he respond to the issues facing contemporary society? It is a process of extrapolation based on independent judgment (ijtihad) and reasoning by analogy (qiyas)" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 76).
"One of Ibn Taymiyya’s most important contributions to Salafi thought is his elaboration of the concept of tawhid—the unity of God. He divided the unity of God into two categories: the unity of lordship and the unity of worship. The former refers to belief in God as the sole sovereign and creator of the universe. All Muslims readily accept this. The second is affirmation of God as the only object of worship and obedience. Ibn Taymiyya reasoned that this latter component of divine unity necessitates following God’s laws. The use of human-made laws is tantamount to obeying or worshipping other than God and thus apostasy" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 78).
"Qutb’s solution to the modern jahiliyya, however, was a stark departure from Mawdudi, who sought to work within the system. Whereas Mawdudi formed a political party and social movement to promote reform, Qutb advocated jihad to establish an Islamic state. In doing so, he argued against well-established Islamic legal opinions that jihad was primarily a struggle against the soul (jihad al-nafs) or a defensive war to protect the Muslim community. In a kind of Islamic liberation theology, he argued that force was necessary to remove the chains of oppression so that Islamic truth could predominate. Even more importantly, because the rulers in the Muslim world used non-Islamic legal codes, they were part of the modern jahiliyya and therefore not real Muslims. As infidels, they could be fought and removed from power, because the primary objective of Muslims is to establish God’s rule on earth (divine hukm)(Wiktorowicz 2005, 79).
"In Islam, there are two types of external jihad: offensive and defensive. In Islamic jurisprudence, the offensive jihad functions to promote the spread of Islam, enlightenment, and civility to the dar al-harb (domain of war). In most contemporary interpretations, the offensive jihad can only be waged under the leadership of the caliph (successor to the Prophet), and it is tempered by truces and various reciprocal agreements between the Islamic state and non-Muslim governments, such as guaranteed freedom of worship for Muslim minorities. Today, very few Islamists focus on this form of jihad" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 83).
"The defensive jihad (jihad al-dafa‘a), however, is a widely accepted concept that is analogous to international norms of self-defense and Judeo-Christian just war theory.31 According to most Islamic scholars, when an outside force invades Muslim territory it is incumbent on all Muslims to wage jihad to protect the faith and the faithful. Mutual protection is seen as a religious obligation intended to ensure the survival of the global Muslim community" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 83).
"Jihadis also drew extensively from the work of Ibn Nuhaas al-Demyati (d.1412). In Advice to Those Who Abstain from Fighting in the Way of Allah, Ibn Nuhaas methodically addresses the various concerns of those who resist participating in jihad.35 He touches on fears of death; concern for children, spouses, relatives, friends, social status, and lineage; love for material things; and desire to improve oneself before participating in battle. For each of these, Ibn Nuhaas quotes the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet to argue that this life means nothing when compared with the hereafter" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 84).
"He also makes a more legalistic argument to demonstrate that jihad is an undeniable duty. Azzam uses Ibn Taymiyya’s distinction between collective and individual duties (fard kifayah and fard ‘ayn) in Islam. Collective duties are obligations that can be fulfilled by a group of Muslims on behalf of the entire Muslim community. Individual duties are those that each and every Muslim must fulfill to avoid falling into sin. In the context of jihad, Ibn Taymiyya argued that, “jihad is obligatory if it is carried out on our initiative and also if it is waged as defense. If we take the initiative, it is a collective duty [which means that] if it is fulfilled by a sufficient number [of Muslims], the obligation lapses for all others and the merit goes to those who have fulfilled it. . . . But if the enemy wants to attack the Muslims, than repelling him becomes a[n] [individual] duty for all those under attack and for the others in order to help him.”37"(Wiktorowicz 2005, 84).
"Although accepting the general prohibition against killing noncombatants, the jihadis consistently draw on Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Shawkani, al-Qurtubi, Ibn Taymiyya, and others to argue that when the infidel kills Muslim civilians it becomes permissible to attack their civilians in kind" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 89).
"What is interesting about the current jihadi arguments about suicide bombings is how little attention seems to be given to constructing a theological argument justifying such attacks. Instead, the vast majority of materials focus on extolling the virtues of martyrdom. Abdullah Azzam’s Virtues of Martyrdom in the Path of Allah is a classic example.70 In it, he elaborates twenty-seven points of evidence about the benefits of martyrdom. Most writings argue that the martyr has a seat in Paradise, avoids the torture of the grave, marries seventy black eyed virgins, and can advocate on behalf of seventy relatives so that they too might reach Paradise. Scholars from all ideological persuasions agree about the virtues of martyrdom" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 92-93).
"Since the 1990s, Al Qaeda and the jihadis have been forced to address two central questions. First, are martyrdom operations suicide? This is critical because Islam explicitly prohibits suicide. Some of the more senior Salafi clerics in Saudi Arabia have argued that these attacks are prohibited. Muhammad Bin Salih Bin Uthaymin (d. 2000), for example, argues that, “as for what some people do regarding activities of suicide, tying explosives to themselves and then approaching disbelievers and detonating amongst them, then this is a case of suicide. . . . So whoever commits suicide then he will be considered eternally to Hell-Fire, remaining there forever.”71 In making this condemnation, the focus is on the act itself: consciously killing oneself" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 93).
"The jihadis, however, focus on the intent of the perpetrator" (Wiktorowicz 2005, 93).